Commit 1bdbc0b0 authored by Robert Obryk's avatar Robert Obryk
Browse files

nixos/security/wrappers: stop using `.real` files 

Before this change it was crucial that nonprivileged users are unable to
create hardlinks to SUID wrappers, lest they be able to provide a
different `.real` file alongside. That was ensured by not providing a
location writable to them in the /run/wrappers tmpfs, (unless
disabled) by the fs.protected_hardlinks=1 sysctl, and by the explicit
own-path check in the wrapper. After this change, ensuring
that property is no longer important, and the check is most likely
redundant.

The simplification of expectations of the wrapper will make it
easier to remove some of the assertions in the wrapper (which currently
cause the wrapper to fail in no_new_privs environments, instead of
executing the target with non-elevated privileges).

Note that wrappers had to be copied (not symlinked) into /run/wrappers
due to the SUID/capability bits, and they couldn't be hard/softlinks of
each other due to those bits potentially differing. Thus, this change
doesn't increase the amount of memory used by /run/wrappers.

This change removes part of the test that is obsoleted by the removal of
`.real` files.
parent 44fde723

nixos/modules/security/wrappers/default.nix

+5 −8
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ let 


  parentWrapperDir = dirOf wrapperDir;



  securityWrapper = pkgs.callPackage ./wrapper.nix {

    inherit parentWrapperDir;

  securityWrapper = sourceProg : pkgs.callPackage ./wrapper.nix {

    inherit parentWrapperDir sourceProg;

  };



  fileModeType =
@@ -91,8 +91,7 @@ let 
    , ...

    }:

    ''

      cp ${securityWrapper}/bin/security-wrapper "$wrapperDir/${program}"

      echo -n "${source}" > "$wrapperDir/${program}.real"

      cp ${securityWrapper source}/bin/security-wrapper "$wrapperDir/${program}"



      # Prevent races

      chmod 0000 "$wrapperDir/${program}"
@@ -119,8 +118,7 @@ let 
    , ...

    }:

    ''

      cp ${securityWrapper}/bin/security-wrapper "$wrapperDir/${program}"

      echo -n "${source}" > "$wrapperDir/${program}.real"

      cp ${securityWrapper source}/bin/security-wrapper "$wrapperDir/${program}"



      # Prevent races

      chmod 0000 "$wrapperDir/${program}"
@@ -251,10 +249,9 @@ in 
    security.apparmor.includes = lib.mapAttrs' (wrapName: wrap: lib.nameValuePair

     "nixos/security.wrappers/${wrapName}" ''

      include "${pkgs.apparmorRulesFromClosure { name="security.wrappers.${wrapName}"; } [

        securityWrapper

        (securityWrapper wrap.source)

      ]}"

      mrpx ${wrap.source},

      r /run/wrappers/wrappers.*/${wrapName}.real,

    '') wrappers;



    ###### wrappers activation script

nixos/modules/security/wrappers/wrapper.c

+9 −23
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ 
#include <syscall.h>

#include <byteswap.h>



#ifndef SOURCE_PROG

#error SOURCE_PROG should be defined via preprocessor commandline

#endif



// aborts when false, printing the failed expression

#define ASSERT(expr) ((expr) ? (void) 0 : assert_failure(#expr))

// aborts when returns non-zero, printing the failed expression and errno
@@ -198,11 +202,10 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) { 
    int didnt_sgid = (rgid == egid) && (egid == sgid);





    // TODO: Determine if this is still useful, in particular if

    // make_caps_ambient somehow relies on these properties.

    // Make sure that we are being executed from the right location,

    // i.e., `safe_wrapper_dir'.  This is to prevent someone from creating

    // hard link `X' from some other location, along with a false

    // `X.real' file, to allow arbitrary programs from being executed

    // with elevated capabilities.

    // i.e., `safe_wrapper_dir'.

    int len = strlen(wrapper_dir);

    if (len > 0 && '/' == wrapper_dir[len - 1])

      --len;
@@ -230,23 +233,6 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) { 
    // And, of course, we shouldn't be writable.

    ASSERT(!(st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP | S_IWOTH)));



    // Read the path of the real (wrapped) program from <self>.real.

    char real_fn[PATH_MAX + 10];

    int real_fn_size = snprintf(real_fn, sizeof(real_fn), "%s.real", self_path);

    ASSERT(real_fn_size < sizeof(real_fn));



    int fd_self = open(real_fn, O_RDONLY);

    ASSERT(fd_self != -1);



    char source_prog[PATH_MAX];

    len = read(fd_self, source_prog, PATH_MAX);

    ASSERT(len != -1);

    ASSERT(len < sizeof(source_prog));

    ASSERT(len > 0);

    source_prog[len] = 0;



    close(fd_self);



    // Read the capabilities set on the wrapper and raise them in to

    // the ambient set so the program we're wrapping receives the

    // capabilities too!
@@ -256,10 +242,10 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) { 
    }

    free(self_path);



    execve(source_prog, argv, environ);

    execve(SOURCE_PROG, argv, environ);

    

    fprintf(stderr, "%s: cannot run `%s': %s\n",

        argv[0], source_prog, strerror(errno));

        argv[0], SOURCE_PROG, strerror(errno));



    return 1;

}

nixos/modules/security/wrappers/wrapper.nix

+2 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line 
{ stdenv, linuxHeaders, parentWrapperDir, debug ? false }:

{ stdenv, linuxHeaders, parentWrapperDir, sourceProg, debug ? false }:

# For testing:

# $ nix-build -E 'with import <nixpkgs> {}; pkgs.callPackage ./wrapper.nix { parentWrapperDir = "/run/wrappers"; debug = true; }'

stdenv.mkDerivation {
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ stdenv.mkDerivation { 
  hardeningEnable = [ "pie" ];

  CFLAGS = [

    ''-DWRAPPER_DIR="${parentWrapperDir}"''

    ''-DSOURCE_PROG="${sourceProg}"''

  ] ++ (if debug then [

    "-Werror" "-Og" "-g"

  ] else [

nixos/tests/wrappers.nix

+0 −7
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -92,13 +92,6 @@ in 
      machine.succeed(cmd_as_regular('/run/wrappers/bin/capsh_with_chown --has-p=CAP_CHOWN'))

      machine.fail(cmd_as_regular('/run/wrappers/bin/capsh_with_chown --has-p=CAP_SYS_ADMIN'))



      # test a few "attacks" against which the wrapper protects itself

      machine.succeed("cp /run/wrappers/bin/suid_root_busybox{,.real} /tmp/")

      machine.fail(cmd_as_regular("/tmp/suid_root_busybox id -u"))



      machine.succeed("chmod u+s,a+w /run/wrappers/bin/suid_root_busybox")

      machine.fail(cmd_as_regular("/run/wrappers/bin/suid_root_busybox id -u"))



      # Test that the only user of apparmor policy includes generated by

      # wrappers works. Ideally this'd be located in a test for the module that

      # actually makes the apparmor policy for ping, but there's no convenient