Commit ac03df96 authored by Eelco Dolstra's avatar Eelco Dolstra
Browse files

openssl: 1.0.1t -> 1.0.1u, 1.0.2h -> 1.0.2i, 1.1.0 -> 1.1.0a 

https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20160922.txt
parent 87ac2b10

pkgs/build-support/fetchurl/boot.nix

+0 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -16,5 +16,4 @@ import <nix/fetchurl.nix> { 
    let m = builtins.match "mirror://([a-z]+)/(.*)" url; in

    if m == null then url

    else builtins.head (mirrors.${builtins.elemAt m 0}) + (builtins.elemAt m 1);



}

pkgs/development/libraries/openssl/1.0.1-CVE-2016-2177.diff

deleted100644 → 0
+0 −256
Original line number Diff line number Diff line 
From 6f35f6deb5ca7daebe289f86477e061ce3ee5f46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 11:10:26 +0100

Subject: [PATCH] Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic



A common idiom in the codebase is:



if (p + len > limit)

{

    return; /* Too long */

}



Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and

limit == p + SIZE



"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS

message).



The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well

defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually

undefined behaviour.



For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation

provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for

values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit!



Issue reported by Guido Vranken.



CVE-2016-2177



Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

---

 ssl/s3_srvr.c  | 14 +++++++-------

 ssl/ssl_sess.c |  2 +-

 ssl/t1_lib.c   | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------

 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)



diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c

index 04cf93a..6c74caa 100644

--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c

+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c

@@ -1040,7 +1040,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)

 

         session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

 

-        if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {

+        if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) {

             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);

             goto f_err;

@@ -1058,7 +1058,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)

     /* get the session-id */

     j = *(p++);

 

-    if (p + j > d + n) {

+    if ((d + n) - p < j) {

         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);

         goto f_err;

@@ -1114,14 +1114,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)

 

     if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {

         /* cookie stuff */

-        if (p + 1 > d + n) {

+        if ((d + n) - p < 1) {

             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);

             goto f_err;

         }

         cookie_len = *(p++);

 

-        if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {

+        if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) {

             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);

             goto f_err;

@@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)

         p += cookie_len;

     }

 

-    if (p + 2 > d + n) {

+    if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {

         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);

         goto f_err;

@@ -1180,7 +1180,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)

     }

 

     /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */

-    if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {

+    if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {

         /* not enough data */

         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);

@@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)

 

     /* compression */

     i = *(p++);

-    if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {

+    if ((d + n) - p < i) {

         /* not enough data */

         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);

diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c

index 48fc451..a97d060 100644

--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c

+++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c

@@ -602,7 +602,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,

     int r;

 #endif

 

-    if (session_id + len > limit) {

+    if (limit - session_id < len) {

         fatal = 1;

         goto err;

     }

diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c

index 0bdb77d..8ed1793 100644

--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c

+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c

@@ -942,11 +942,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,

         0x02, 0x03,             /* SHA-1/ECDSA */

     };

 

-    if (data >= (limit - 2))

+    if (limit - data <= 2)

         return;

     data += 2;

 

-    if (data > (limit - 4))

+    if (limit - data < 4)

         return;

     n2s(data, type);

     n2s(data, size);

@@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,

     if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)

         return;

 

-    if (data + size > limit)

+    if (limit - data < size)

         return;

     data += size;

 

@@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,

         const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);

         const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);

 

-        if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)

+        if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))

             return;

         if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)

             return;

@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,

     } else {

         const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);

 

-        if (data + len != limit)

+        if (limit - data != (int)(len))

             return;

         if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)

             return;

@@ -1019,19 +1019,19 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,

     if (data == limit)

         goto ri_check;

 

-    if (data > (limit - 2))

+    if (limit - data < 2)

         goto err;

 

     n2s(data, len);

 

-    if (data + len != limit)

+    if (limit - data != len)

         goto err;

 

-    while (data <= (limit - 4)) {

+    while (limit - data >= 4) {

         n2s(data, type);

         n2s(data, size);

 

-        if (data + size > (limit))

+        if (limit - data < size)

             goto err;

 # if 0

         fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);

@@ -1460,20 +1460,20 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,

                              SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);

 # endif

 

-    if (data >= (d + n - 2))

+    if ((d + n) - data <= 2)

         goto ri_check;

 

     n2s(data, length);

-    if (data + length != d + n) {

+    if ((d + n) - data != length) {

         *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

         return 0;

     }

 

-    while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {

+    while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {

         n2s(data, type);

         n2s(data, size);

 

-        if (data + size > (d + n))

+        if ((d + n) - data < size)

             goto ri_check;

 

         if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)

@@ -2179,29 +2179,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,

     /* Skip past DTLS cookie */

     if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {

         i = *(p++);

-        p += i;

-        if (p >= limit)

+

+        if (limit - p <= i)

             return -1;

+

+        p += i;

     }

     /* Skip past cipher list */

     n2s(p, i);

-    p += i;

-    if (p >= limit)

+    if (limit - p <= i)

         return -1;

+    p += i;

+

     /* Skip past compression algorithm list */

     i = *(p++);

-    p += i;

-    if (p > limit)

+    if (limit - p < i)

         return -1;

+    p += i;

+

     /* Now at start of extensions */

-    if ((p + 2) >= limit)

+    if (limit - p <= 2)

         return 0;

     n2s(p, i);

-    while ((p + 4) <= limit) {

+    while (limit - p >= 4) {

         unsigned short type, size;

         n2s(p, type);

         n2s(p, size);

-        if (p + size > limit)

+        if (limit - p < size)

             return 0;

         if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {

             int r;

-- 

1.9.1

pkgs/development/libraries/openssl/1.0.2-CVE-2016-2177.diff

deleted100644 → 0
+0 −279
Original line number Diff line number Diff line 
From a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 11:10:26 +0100

Subject: [PATCH] Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic



A common idiom in the codebase is:



if (p + len > limit)

{

    return; /* Too long */

}



Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and

limit == p + SIZE



"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS

message).



The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well

defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually

undefined behaviour.



For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation

provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for

values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit!



Issue reported by Guido Vranken.



CVE-2016-2177



Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

---

 ssl/s3_srvr.c  | 14 +++++++-------

 ssl/ssl_sess.c |  2 +-

 ssl/t1_lib.c   | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------

 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)



diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c

index ab28702..ab7f690 100644

--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c

+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c

@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)

 

         session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

 

-        if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {

+        if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) {

             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);

             goto f_err;

@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)

     /* get the session-id */

     j = *(p++);

 

-    if (p + j > d + n) {

+    if ((d + n) - p < j) {

         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);

         goto f_err;

@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)

 

     if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {

         /* cookie stuff */

-        if (p + 1 > d + n) {

+        if ((d + n) - p < 1) {

             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);

             goto f_err;

         }

         cookie_len = *(p++);

 

-        if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {

+        if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) {

             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);

             goto f_err;

@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)

         }

     }

 

-    if (p + 2 > d + n) {

+    if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {

         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);

         goto f_err;

@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)

     }

 

     /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */

-    if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {

+    if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {

         /* not enough data */

         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);

@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)

 

     /* compression */

     i = *(p++);

-    if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {

+    if ((d + n) - p < i) {

         /* not enough data */

         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);

diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c

index b182998..54ee783 100644

--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c

+++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c

@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,

     int r;

 #endif

 

-    if (session_id + len > limit) {

+    if (limit - session_id < len) {

         fatal = 1;

         goto err;

     }

diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c

index fb64607..cdac011 100644

--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c

+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c

@@ -1867,11 +1867,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,

         0x02, 0x03,             /* SHA-1/ECDSA */

     };

 

-    if (data >= (limit - 2))

+    if (limit - data <= 2)

         return;

     data += 2;

 

-    if (data > (limit - 4))

+    if (limit - data < 4)

         return;

     n2s(data, type);

     n2s(data, size);

@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,

     if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)

         return;

 

-    if (data + size > limit)

+    if (limit - data < size)

         return;

     data += size;

 

@@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,

         const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);

         const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);

 

-        if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)

+        if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))

             return;

         if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)

             return;

@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,

     } else {

         const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);

 

-        if (data + len != limit)

+        if (limit - data != (int)(len))

             return;

         if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)

             return;

@@ -2053,19 +2053,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,

     if (data == limit)

         goto ri_check;

 

-    if (data > (limit - 2))

+    if (limit - data < 2)

         goto err;

 

     n2s(data, len);

 

-    if (data + len != limit)

+    if (limit - data != len)

         goto err;

 

-    while (data <= (limit - 4)) {

+    while (limit - data >= 4) {

         n2s(data, type);

         n2s(data, size);

 

-        if (data + size > (limit))

+        if (limit - data < size)

             goto err;

 # if 0

         fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);

@@ -2472,18 +2472,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,

     if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)

         return 1;

 

-    if (data >= limit - 2)

+    if (limit - data <= 2)

         return 1;

     n2s(data, len);

 

-    if (data > limit - len)

+    if (limit - data < len)

         return 1;

 

-    while (data <= limit - 4) {

+    while (limit - data >= 4) {

         n2s(data, type);

         n2s(data, size);

 

-        if (data + size > limit)

+        if (limit - data < size)

             return 1;

         if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)

             return 0;

@@ -2569,20 +2569,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,

                              SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);

 # endif

 

-    if (data >= (d + n - 2))

+    if ((d + n) - data <= 2)

         goto ri_check;

 

     n2s(data, length);

-    if (data + length != d + n) {

+    if ((d + n) - data != length) {

         *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;

         return 0;

     }

 

-    while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {

+    while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {

         n2s(data, type);

         n2s(data, size);

 

-        if (data + size > (d + n))

+        if ((d + n) - data < size)

             goto ri_check;

 

         if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)

@@ -3307,29 +3307,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,

     /* Skip past DTLS cookie */

     if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {

         i = *(p++);

-        p += i;

-        if (p >= limit)

+

+        if (limit - p <= i)

             return -1;

+

+        p += i;

     }

     /* Skip past cipher list */

     n2s(p, i);

-    p += i;

-    if (p >= limit)

+    if (limit - p <= i)

         return -1;

+    p += i;

+

     /* Skip past compression algorithm list */

     i = *(p++);

-    p += i;

-    if (p > limit)

+    if (limit - p < i)

         return -1;

+    p += i;

+

     /* Now at start of extensions */

-    if ((p + 2) >= limit)

+    if (limit - p <= 2)

         return 0;

     n2s(p, i);

-    while ((p + 4) <= limit) {

+    while (limit - p >= 4) {

         unsigned short type, size;

         n2s(p, type);

         n2s(p, size);

-        if (p + size > limit)

+        if (limit - p < size)

             return 0;

         if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {

             int r;

-- 

1.9.1

pkgs/development/libraries/openssl/default.nix

+6 −14
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -106,26 +106,18 @@ let 
in {



  openssl_1_0_1 = common {

    version = "1.0.1t";

    sha256 = "4a6ee491a2fdb22e519c76fdc2a628bb3cec12762cd456861d207996c8a07088";

    patches = [

      # https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=6f35f6deb5ca7daebe289f86477e061ce3ee5f46

      ./1.0.1-CVE-2016-2177.diff

    ];

    version = "1.0.1u";

    sha256 = "0fb7y9pwbd76pgzd7xzqfrzibmc0vf03sl07f34z5dhm2b5b84j3";

  };



  openssl_1_0_2 = common {

    version = "1.0.2h";

    sha256 = "1d4007e53aad94a5b2002fe045ee7bb0b3d98f1a47f8b2bc851dcd1c74332919";

    patches = [

      # https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7

      ./1.0.2-CVE-2016-2177.diff

    ];

    version = "1.0.2i";

    sha256 = "0vyy038676cv3m2523fi9ll9nkjxadqdnz18zdp5nm6925yli1wj";

  };



  openssl_1_1_0 = common {

    version = "1.1.0";

    sha256 = "10lcpmnxap9nw8ymdglys93cgkwd1lf1rz4fhq5whwhlmkwrzipm";

    version = "1.1.0a";

    sha256 = "0as40a1lipl9qfax7495jc1xfb049ygavkaxxk4y5kcn8birdrn2";

  };



}